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Abstract— In this paper, we are concerned of a particularly 
severe security attack that affects the ad hoc networks routing 
protocols, it is called the wormhole attack. We can think of 
wormhole attack as a two phase process launched by one or 
several malicious nodes. In the first phase, these malicious 
nodes, called wormhole nodes, try to lure legitimate nodes to 
send data to other nodes via them. In the second phase, 
wormhole nodes could exploit the data in variety of ways. We 
will introduce the wormhole attack modes and classes, and 
point to its impact and threat on ad hoc networks. We also 
analyze the wormhole attack modes from an attacker’s 
perspective and suggest new improvements to this type of 
attacks. We finally summarize and conclude this paper.  
Keywords-attacks; ad hoc network; security; tunneling; 
wormhole 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the rapid development in wireless technology, ad 
hoc networks have emerged in many forms. These networks 
operate in the license free frequency band and do not require 
any investment in infrastructure, making them attractive for 
military and selected commercial applications. However, 
there are many unsolved problems in ad hoc networks; 
securing the network being one of the major concerns.  Ad 
hoc networks are vulnerable to attacks due to many reasons; 
amongst them are the absence of infrastructure, wireless 
links between nodes, limited physical Protection, and the 
Lack of a centralized monitoring or management, and the 
resource constraints. A particularly severe security attack, 
called the wormhole attack, has been introduced in the 
context of ad-hoc networks [1], [2], [3]. During the attack [4] 
a malicious node captures packets from one location in the 
network, and tunnels them to another malicious node at a 
distant point, which replays them locally, this is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The tunnel can be established in many different 
ways, such as through an out-of-band hidden channel (e.g., a 
wired link), packet encapsulation, or high powered 
transmission. This tunnel makes the tunneled packet arrive 
either sooner or with less number of hops compared to the 
packets transmitted over normal multihop routes. This 
creates the illusion that the two end points of the tunnel are 
very close to each other. In this paper, we explain the attack 
modes and point to the impact of this attack and its threats. 
From an attacker’s perspective, we analyze each of the 
attack’s modes’ benefits and suitable conditions and think 
how to improve the wormhole attack by introducing the 
concept of “complex wormhole attacks”. The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
wormhole attack modes, threats, impact on the ad hoc 
networks applications and routing, and solutions that have 
been proposed in the literature as a countermeasure for this 
attack. In section III,   we analyze the different attack modes 
in details, while in section IV we suggest complex wormhole 
attacks to improve the regular wormhole attacks. Finally, 
conclusions and future directions are given in section V. 
 
 
Figure 1. The wormhole attack 
 
II. THE WORMHOLE ATTACK 
In this section we explain the wormhole attacks modes 
and classes while pointing to the impact of the wormhole 
attack and the efforts that have been done in the literature to 
detect and prevent this attack. 
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A. Wormhole Attack Modes 
Wormhole attacks can be launched using several modes, 
among these modes [5], we mention: 
 Wormhole using Encapsulation: In this mode a 
malicious node at one part of the network and hears the 
RREQ packet.  It tunnels it to a second colluding party at a 
distant location near the destination. The second party then 
rebroadcasts the RREQ. The neighbours of the second 
colluding party receive the RREQ and drop any further 
legitimate requests that may arrive later on legitimate 
multihop paths. The result is that the routes between the 
source and the destination go through the two colluding 
nodes that will be said to have formed a wormhole between 
them. This prevents nodes from discovering legitimate paths 
that are more than two hops away.  For example, consider 
Figure 2 [5]  in which nodes A and B try to discover the 
shortest path between them, in the presence of the two 
malicious nodes X and Y. Node A broadcasts a RREQ, X gets 
the RREQ and encapsulates it in a packet destined to Y 
through the path that exists between X and Y (U-V-W-Z). 
Node Y demarshalls the packet, and rebroadcasts it again, 
which reaches B. Note that due to the packet encapsulation, 
the hop count does not increase during the traversal through 
U-V-W-Z. Concurrently, the RREQ travels from A to B 
through C-D-E. Node B now has two routes, the first is four 
hops long (A-C-D-E-B), and the second is apparently three 
hops long (A-X-Y-B). Node B will choose the second route 
since it appears to be the shortest while in reality it is seven 
hops long. Any routing protocol that uses the metric of 
shortest path to choose the best route is vulnerable to this 
mode of wormhole attack. 
This mode of the wormhole attack is easy to launch since 
the two ends of the wormhole do not need to have any 
cryptographic information, nor do they need any special 
capabilities, such as a high speed wire line link or a high 
power source. 
 
 
Figure 2. Wormhole through packet encapsulation [5] 
 
Wormhole using Out-of-Band Channel: The second 
mode for this attack is the use of an out of band channel. 
This channel can be achieved, for example, by using a long-
range directional wireless link or a direct wired link. This 
mode of attack is more difficult to launch than the previous 
one since it needs specialized hardware capability. Consider 
the scenario depicted in Figure 3[5]. Node A sends a RREQ 
to node B, and nodes X and Y are malicious nodes having an 
out-of-band channel between them. Node X tunnels the 
RREQ to Y, which is a legitimate neighbor of B. Node Y 
broadcasts the packet to its neighbors, including B. B gets 
two RREQs—A-X-Y-B and A-C-D-E-F-B. The first is both 
shorter and faster than the second, and is thus chosen by B. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Wormhole through out-of-band channel [5] 
 
Wormhole with High Power Transmission Another 
method is the use of high power transmission. In this mode, 
when a single malicious node gets a RREQ, it broadcasts the 
request at a high power level, a capability which is not 
available to other nodes in the network. Any node that hears 
the high-power broadcast rebroadcasts it towards the 
destination. By this method, the malicious node increases its 
chance to be in the routes established between the source and 
the destination even without the participation of a colluding 
node.  
Wormhole using Packet Relay: Wormhole using Packet 
Relay is another mode of the wormhole attack in which a 
malicious node relays packets between two distant nodes to 
convince them that they are neighbours. It can be launched 
by even one malicious node. Cooperation by a greater 
number of malicious nodes serves to expand the neighbour 
list of a victim node to several hops. It is carried out by an 
intruder node X located within transmission range of 
legitimate nodes A and B, where A and B are not themselves 
within transmission range of each other. Intruder node X 
merely tunnels control traffic between A and B (and vice 
versa), without the modification presumed by the routing 
protocol  e.g. without stating its address as the source in the 
packets header  so that X is virtually invisible. This results in 
an extraneous inexistent A - B link which in fact is controlled 
by X, as shown in Figure 4. Node X can afterwards drop 
tunneled packets or break this link at will. Two intruder 
nodes X and X′, connected by a wireless or wired private 
medium, can also collude to create a longer (and more 
harmful) wormhole, as shown in Figure 5. An extraneous A - 
B link can be artificially created by an intruder node X by 
wormholing control messages between A and B as in Figure 
4. A longer wormhole can also be created by two colluding 
intruders X and X′ as in Figure 5. To successfully exploit the 
wormhole, the attacker must wait until A and B have 
exchanged sufficient HELLO messages (through the 
wormhole) to establish a symmetric link. Until that moment, 
other tunneled control messages would be rejected, because 
the OLSR protocol specifies that TC/MID/HNA messages 
should not be processed if the relayer node (the last hop) is 
not a symmetric neighbor. However, once created, the A - B 
link is at the mercy of the attacker.   
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Figure 4. A wormhole created by node X 
 
 
Figure 5. A longer wormhole created by two colluding nodes 
 
Wormhole using Protocol Deviations: A wormhole 
attack can also be done through protocol deviations. During 
the RREQ forwarding, the nodes typically back off for a 
random amount of time before forwarding reduce MAC 
layer collisions. A malicious node can create a wormhole by 
simply not complying with the protocol and broadcasting 
without backing off. The purpose is to let the request packet 
it forwards arrive first at the destination. 
 The utility of organizing combinations of network 
attacks as graphs is well established. Network attack graphs 
represent a collection of possible penetration scenarios in a 
computer network. The graph can focus on the extent to 
which an adversary can penetrate a network to achieve a 
particular goal, given an initial set of capabilities. They 
represent not only specific attacks but categories of attacks. 
They can detect previously unseen attacks which have 
common features with attacks in graphs. Figure 6 depicts an 
attack graph we have developed for the wormhole attack to 
illustrate its different modes. 
 
Figure 6. Attack graph of wormhole attack modes 
B. Wormhole Attack Classification 
The classification of such an attack facilitates the design 
of prevention and detection methods. According to whether 
the attackers are visible on the route, we classify the 
wormholes into three types: closed, half open, and open [6].  
Figure 7 [7] illustrates the three types of wormhole attack. 
 Open Wormhole attack: In this type of wormhole, the 
attackers include themselves in the RREQ packet header 
following the route discovery procedure. Other nodes are 
aware that the malicious nodes lie on the path but they would 
think that the malicious nodes are direct neighbors. 
Closed Wormhole Attack: The attackers do not modify the 
content of the packet, even the packet in a route discovery 
packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the packet form one side 
of wormhole to another side and it rebroadcasts the packet. 
Half open wormhole attack: One side of wormhole does 
not modify the packet and only another side modifies the 
packet, following the route discovery procedure. 
 
Figure  7.  Different types of wormhole attack [7] 
C. Wormhole Attack Threats 
A wormhole tunnel could actually be useful if used for 
forwarding all the packets. However, in its malicious 
incarnation, it attacks nodes to subvert the correct operation 
of ad-hoc and sensor network routing protocols. We can 
think of wormhole attack as a two phase process launched by 
one or several malicious nodes. In the first phase, the two 
malicious end points of the tunnel may use it to pass routing 
traffic to attract routes through them. In the second phase, 
wormhole nodes could exploit the data in variety of ways. 
They can disrupt the data flow by selectively dropping or 
modifying data packets, generating unnecessary routing 
activities by turning off the wormhole link periodically, etc. 
The attacker can also simply record the traffic for later 
analysis. Using wormholes an attacker can also break any 
protocol that directly or indirectly relies on geographic 
proximity. For example, target tracking applications in 
sensor networks can be easily confused in the presence of 
wormholes. Similarly, wormholes will affect connectivity-
based localization algorithms, as two neighbouring nodes are 
localized nearby and the wormhole links essentially ‘fold’ 
the entire network. This can have a major impact as location 
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is a useful service in many protocols and application, and 
often out-of-band location systems such as GPS are 
considered expensive or unusable because of the 
environment. It should be noted that wormholes are 
dangerous by themselves, even if attackers are diligently 
forwarding all packets without any disruptions, on some 
level, providing a communication service to the network. 
With wormhole in place, affected network nodes do not have 
a true picture of the network, which may disrupt the 
localization-based schemes, and hence lead to the wrong 
decisions, etc. Wormhole can also be used to simply 
aggregate a large number of network packets for the purpose 
of traffic analysis or encryption compromise.  
The wormhole attack also has a strong impact on both 
periodic and on demand routing protocols as follows: 
Periodic protocols: Periodic protocols are based on the 
distance vector routing algorithm, where each node stores a 
routing table that contains for each possible destination the 
associated routing cost, usually in number of hops, and the 
corresponding next hop towards that destination. 
Periodically, or when a route change occurs, each node 
broadcasts its routing table in order to inform its neighbors 
about possible route changes. Every node that receives a 
route update adjusts its own routing table based on the 
broadcast received from the neighboring nodes. 
To illustrate the impact of wormhole attacks on periodic 
protocols, consider Figure 8 which shows an ad hoc network 
of 13 nodes. A node ni is connected to a node nj if the 
distance between them is less than the communication range 
r. Consider an attacker establishing a wormhole link between 
nodes n9 and n2, using a low-latency link. When node n9 
broadcasts its routing table, node n2 will hear the broadcast 
via the wormhole and assume it is one hop away from n9. 
Then, n2 will update its table entries for node s9, reachable 
via one hop, nodes {n8, n10, n11, n12}, reachable via two hops, 
and broadcast its own routing table. Similarly, the neighbors 
of n2 will adjust their own routing tables. Note that nodes 
{n1, n3, n4, n5, n7} now route via n2 to reach any of the nodes 
{n9, n10, n11, n12} [8].  
 
 
Figure 8.  Wormhole attack on a distance vector-based routing protocol   
 
On-demand protocols: A wormhole attack against on 
demand routing protocols can result in similar false route 
establishment as in the case of periodic protocols. In the 
route discovery mechanism, a node S initiates a route 
discovery to node D by broadcasting a RREQ message. All 
nodes that hear the RREQ message will rebroadcast the 
request until the destination D has been discovered. Once the 
destination D is reached, node D will respond with a RREP 
message. The RREP message will follow a similar route 
discovery procedure, if the path from D to S has not been 
previously discovered. If an attacker mounts a wormhole link 
between the RREQ initiator S and the destination D, and if S, 
D are more than one hop away, then a one-hop route via the 
wormhole will be established from S to D. As an example, 
consider Figure 9 which is the same topology as in Figure8 
Consider that the attacker establishes a wormhole link 
between nodes n9 and n2 and assume that node n9 wants to 
send data to node n2. When node n9 broadcasts the RREQ, 
the attacker will forward the request via the wormhole link to 
node n2. Node n2 will reply with a RREP and the attacker 
using wormhole link will forward the reply to node n9. At 
this point, nodes n2, n9 will establish a route via the 
wormhole link, as if they were one hop neighbors. Similarly, 
if any of the nodes {n1, n3, n4, n5, n7} wants to send data to 
any of the nodes {n9, n10, n11, n12}, the routing paths 
established will include the wormhole link [8] . 
 
 
Figure 9. Wormhole attack against an on-demand routing protocol 
  
From the above examples and the existing literature [2], we 
note that the existence of wormhole links impacts the 
network routing service performance in the following three 
ways:  
(1) Nodes can become sinkholes [1] without even being 
aware that they are victims of a wormhole attack (as noted in 
both Figure 8, and Figure 9, nodes s2, s9 become sinkhole 
nodes and attract all traffic from surrounding nodes). Hence, 
a significant amount of traffic is routed through the 
wormhole link and the attacker can control and observe a 
significant amount of traffic flow without the need to deploy 
multiple observation points.  
(2) If an attacker kept the wormhole link functional at all 
times and did not drop any packets, the wormhole would 
actually provide a useful network service by expediting the 
packet delivery. However, by selectively dropping packets, 
the attacker can lower the throughput of the network.  
(3) Furthermore, by simply switching the wormhole link on 
and off, the attacker can trigger a route oscillation within the 
network, thus leading to a DoS attack, driving the routing 
service to be unusable [8]. 
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D. Wormhole Attack Proposed Solutions 
 Several solutions have been proposed in the literature for 
the wormhole attack, the solutions can be categorized into 
location based, time based, key based, statistics, and graph 
based solutions. In this section we give a brief overview of 
these solutions.  
Location and Time Based Solutions 
Most of the proposed wormhole solutions in the literature are 
based on location or time. Packet leashes have been 
proposed and specifically two types of packet leashes: 
geographical and temporal were considered in [2]. The main 
idea is that by authenticating either an extremely precise 
timestamp or location information combined with a loose 
timestamp, a receiver can determine if the packet has 
traversed an unrealistic distance for the specific network 
technology used. Packet leashing was added to each packet 
on each link to restrict the transmission distance of the 
packet. Two types of packet leashes could be added into the 
packet. One is geographical leash in which the sender inserts 
its own position and sending time into the packet, the 
receiver will estimate the maximum distance between the 
sender and itself based on its own position and receiving 
time. If the distance exceeds the transmission range, the 
packet will be discarded. The other type is temporal leash. 
This mechanism assumes that the maximum transmission 
speed of radio signal is the speed of light, thus the expiration 
time of a packet can be estimated using the maximum 
transmission range and the speed of light. The expiration 
time of the packet is inserted into the packet, and then the 
receiver can check whether the received packet has expired 
or not based on its receiving time. A drawback of packet 
leashes is that it requires extremely tight time 
synchronization and GPS. In [9], secure tracking of node 
encounters (SECTOR) was proposed. It applied similar 
principle as packet leashes, with the difference that it 
measured the distance at a single hop and it required special 
hardware at each node. Directional antennas can be 
considered as location based solutions and were used in [3] 
to prevent the wormhole attack. 
A mechanism based on signal strength and geographical 
information for detecting malicious nodes staging HELLO 
flood and wormhole attacks was proposed in [10]. The idea 
is to compare the signal strength of a reception with its 
expected value, calculated using geographical information 
and the pre-defined transceiver specification. A protocol for 
disseminating information about detection of malicious 
nodes was also proposed.  
In [11], another method was suggested in which the 
sender sets the Destination-only flag such that only the 
destination can respond to the RREQ packet. Once the 
RREQ packet reaches the destination, it responds with a 
RREP with its current position. The sender retrieves the 
receiver’s position from the RREP packet and estimates the 
lower bound of hops between the sender and the receiver. If 
the received route is shorter than the estimated shortest path, 
the corresponding route will be discarded. Otherwise, the 
sender will select the shortest path corresponding to the 
estimation. Once a wormhole is detected by the sender, the 
sender temporarily enables the path with wormhole and 
sends out a TRACE packet to the receiver. This TRACE 
packet is forwarded by each intermediate node through the 
route with wormhole. When a node on the route receives the 
TRACE packet, it replies the source with its current position 
and its hop count to the destination. Then, the sender can 
estimate the increase of hop count at each node using the 
received position. If the increase of hop count at one node is 
not one comparing to its previous hop, then this node and its 
previous hop node are identified as the wormhole. This 
approach was illustrated with more details in [12], where an 
end-to-end detection of wormhole attack (EDWA) in 
wireless ad-hoc networks was explained in details. In 
addition analysis and simulation results have shown that the 
end-to-end wormhole detection method is effective when the 
source and destination are not too far away. 
A four way handshaking message exchange method was 
proposed in [13] for detecting and preventing wormhole 
attacks against the OLSR routing protocol. To infer 
suspicious links, new control packets were defined. A 
timeout value is set for the control packets, and depending on 
the measured control packets delay, links can be judged as 
suspicious and then verifies as wormhole links. In [14] an 
end to end protocol to secure ad hoc networks against 
wormhole attacks was proposed.  The algorithm provides a 
lower bound on the minimum number of hops on a good 
route. Any path showing lesser hop-counts is shown to be 
under attack. The algorithm requires every node to know its 
location. With very accurate GPS available, this assumption 
is not unreasonable. Since the protocol does not require 
speed or time, there is no need for clock synchronization. In 
the absence of any error in the location, there are no false 
alarms i.e. no good paths are discarded.  
Key Based Solutions 
For the key based solutions, a scheme was proposed in[15], 
and [8] depending on location-based keys, a node-to-node 
authentication scheme, which is not only able to localize the 
impact of compromised nodes within their vicinity, but also 
to facilitate the establishment of pairwise keys between 
neighboring nodes was developed. These schemes only 
accept messages from authenticated neighbors and discard 
those messages tunneled from multi-hop-away locations 
preventing thus the wormhole attack.  
Statistics- Based Solutions 
In [16], a statistical based solution was proposed. The main 
idea of the proposed scheme SAM was based on the 
observation that certain statistics of the discovered routes by 
routing protocols will change dramatically under wormhole 
attacks. Hence, it was possible to examine such statistics to 
detect this type of routing attacks and pinpoint the attackers 
if enough routing information is available (obtained by 
multi-path routing). Some other schemes use statistical 
testing to measure the distribution of the number of 
neighbors or the distance of all pairs of nodes [17].  
Graph-Based Solutions 
 One type of wormhole detection involves graph theories. In 
Multi-Dimensional Scaling Visualization of Wormhole 
(MDS-VOW) [18] multi-dimensional scaling in graph theory 
was used to reconstruct the topology of the network. A 
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wormhole attack could cause distortion of network topology 
which could be detected using graph visualization. In [19], it 
has been noted that the placement of wormhole influences 
the network connectivity by creating long links between two 
sets of nodes located potentially far away. The resulting 
connectivity graph thus deviates from the true connectivity 
graph. The detection algorithm essentially looks for 
forbidden substructures in the connectivity graph that should 
not be present in a legal connectivity graph. Knowledge of 
the wireless communication model between the nodes helps 
the detection algorithm. This is because a communication 
model can help define what substructures observed in the 
connectivity graph could be forbidden. 
In [20], a graph theoretic framework for modeling wormhole 
links and deriving the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
detecting and defending against wormhole attacks was 
presented. Based on this framework, candidate solution 
preventing wormholes should construct a communication 
graph that is a subgraph of the geometric graph defined by 
the radio range of the network nodes. Making use of our 
framework, a cryptographic mechanism based on local 
broadcast keys in order to prevent wormholes was proposed. 
The solution requires only a small fraction of the nodes to 
know their location. 
Neighbor-Based solutions  
A wormhole attack prevention algorithm that depends on 
neighbor monitoring was suggested in [20]. In this method, 
all nodes monitor their neighbors’ behavior when they send 
RREQ messages to the destination by using a special list 
called Neighbor List. When a source node receives some 
RREP messages, it can detect a route under wormhole attack 
among the routes. Once wormhole node is detected, source 
node records them in the Wormhole Node List. Even though 
malicious nodes have been excluded from routing in the past, 
the nodes have a chance of attack once more. Therefore, the 
information of wormhole nodes is stored at the source nodes 
to prevent them taking part in routing again. In [21], another 
method was suggested. Whenever routing takes place in the 
network, analysis of the frequencies of links in different 
routes is done. If any of the links are suspicious, then the 
available trust information is used to check if the link is that 
of a wormhole. Following the neighbor monitoring phase, a 
trust vector of a node containing the trust values to each of 
its neighbors is calculated. In the trust model used, nodes 
monitor neighbors based on their packet drop pattern and not 
on the measure of number of drops. Finally, the algorithm 
for detection of Wormhole is run during the routing phase. A 
wormhole attack detection approach based on the probability 
distribution of the neighboring-node-number, WAPN, which 
helps the nodes to judge whether a wormhole attack is taking 
place and whether they are in the influencing area of the 
attack was proposed in [22]. In [23], wormhole attack 
defense method was proposed. In the proposed method, each 
node maintains its neighbors’ information. According to the 
information, each node can identify replayed packet that 
forwarded by two attackers. 
 
III. ATTACK BENEFITS 
In this section, we shall wear an attacker’s hat and 
consider the wormhole attack from an attacker’s 
perspective. To launch a particular wormhole attack mode, 
an attacker needs to know the way of launching it, its 
advantages and disadvantages of this attack from his point 
of view, and its impact of the remaining parts of the 
network. It is also important to know the challenges that 
will be faced to launch a successful attack, the suitable 
number of needed malicious nodes, the suitable attack mode 
for a specific network topology and the countermeasures 
that might be used in order to prevent and detect this attack.  
There are common benefits to all attack modes, which are 
illusion given to the network nodes that the paths containing 
malicious nodes have the minimum number of hops or can 
deliver traffic in a speedier way. To make the comparison 
clear, all points of comparison are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WORMHOLE ATTACK MODES FRO M AN ATTACKER’S PERSPECTIVE 
  
 Encapsulation Out of Band High Power Packet Relay Protocol Deviations 
Attack 
mode 
launching 
method 
Node encapsulates 
the route request and 
sends it to colluding 
node which 
decapsulates it and 
forwards the RREQ 
Nodes send 
RREQs between 
them by using a 
long-range 
directional 
wireless link or 
a direct wired 
link 
A node gets a 
RREQ, it 
broadcasts it  at a 
high power level, 
Any node that 
hears the high-
power broadcast 
rebroadcasts it 
towards the 
destination 
Nodes relay 
packets between 
two distant nodes 
to convince them 
that they are 
neighbours 
Nodes do not back 
off to let the request 
packet it forwards 
arrive first at the 
destination. 
Advantages 1. There is a smaller 
probability of  a 
RREQ being 
1.Control packet 
arrives faster 
since there is no 
1.Control packets 
arrive faster  
2.It has a less 
1. Two nodes think 
they are neighbors 
although they are 
Control packet 
arrives faster 
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discarded than other 
RREQs that are 
repeatedly received 
by intermediate 
nodes 
2. A RREQ packet 
arriving at 
destination does not 
hold intermediate 
nodes as hops, and 
then it appears to 
have passed through 
min number of hops. 
 
processing from 
intermediate 
nodes 
2.It has a less 
probability of 
being discarded 
than other 
RREQs that are 
repeatedly 
received by 
intermediate 
nodes 
3.Control 
packets arriving 
at destination, 
do not hold 
intermediate 
nodes as hops, 
then it appears 
to have passed 
through min 
number of hops. 
 
probability of 
being discarded 
than other RREQs 
that are repeatedly 
received by 
intermediate 
nodes 
3. Control packet 
arriving at 
destination, does 
not hold 
intermediate 
nodes as hops, 
then it appears to 
have passed 
through min 
number of hops. 
4.No need for 
colluding nodes, 
any node could do 
the job 
 
not, and every 
RREQ to be sent to 
neighbors will 
arrive to the 
relaying nodes 
invisibly.  
2.Control packet 
seems to arrive 
using the minimum 
number of hops 
Disadvanta
ges 
1. Resources and 
time consumption in 
packet encapsulation 
and decapsulation 
 
1. This mode of 
attack is difficult 
to launch than 
the previous one 
since it needs 
specialized 
hardware 
capability. 
2. Also the time 
difference in 
control packets 
arrival could be 
very remarkable. 
 
1.Needs high 
power 
2.Also speed 
difference could 
be noticed 
1. Relaying nodes 
spend resources for 
processing RREQ 
packets and hiding 
their IDs  
Does not necessarily 
provide the 
minimum number of 
hops, it is not 
reliable if collisions 
occur to give a 
minimum speed as 
well 
Suitable 
cases or 
network 
topology 
 
Large number of 
intermediate nodes, in 
that case we avoid 
intermediate 
processing 
 
A small network 
so that the speed 
difference would 
not be that 
remarkable 
 
A  network with a 
lot of intermediate 
nodes between 
source and 
destination and 
wide network 
range to make a 
big difference 
Victim nodes need 
to be at least two 
hops away 
Network with large 
number of nodes to 
have a big 
difference from 
small savings 
 
Challenges 
to be faced 
1.Send encapsulated 
packet to the proper 
colluding node, while 
having a 
predetermined path  
2. If an intermediate 
node checks the 
Need of special 
hardware and 
arrangements for 
out of band 
channels 
 
Not only enough 
energy needs to be 
there, but also 
power 
adjustments  are 
needed to make 
the transmitted 
RREQ go to some 
1.Insert malicious 
nodes at proper 
positions 
2.Hide malicious 
node names so that 
it does not appear 
on the RREQ 
packets 
Collisions may 
occur between 
transmissions of 
malicious nodes 
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contents of the sent 
packet 
 
 
suitable 
neighboring 
nodes, else the 
RREQ could go 
out of the 
network’s range 
 
 
3.Choice of 
optimum number 
of relaying nodes 
depending on the 
victim’s distance 
4. Communication 
between relaying 
nodes 
 
Possible 
solutions for 
challenges 
For the predetermined 
path to be established, 
colluding nodes could 
send regular RREQ 
packets to establish 
paths. 
For the second 
challenge of nodes 
checking packets, 
complex attacks will 
solve this problem 
 
 Send a RREQ 
with different 
power levels By 
this, the malicious 
node will have 
have a primary 
network topology. 
It can then use 
communication 
ranges, and 
number of hops to 
adjust its power 
according to the 
location of the 
destination 
 
Start by having a 
large number of 
relaying nodes and 
then minimize 
them to get the 
optimum 
performance with a 
small number of 
malicious nodes 
and traffic conquer. 
Different relaying 
nodes distribution 
should also be tried 
with optimum 
number 
A priority or round 
robin scheme for 
malicious nodes 
packets could be 
used 
Minimum 
number of 
malicious 
nodes 
Two nodes Two nodes One node One node One node 
Impact on 
other 
network 
nodes 
1. This method 
attracts all traffic  in 
the wormhole tunnel, 
thus intermediate 
nodes within the 
tunnel can suffer from 
resource exhaustion 
due to increase of 
traffic they have to 
route 
2. Some nodes might 
have a wrong picture 
of  the network 
topology  
1.This method 
saves the 
resources of 
other 
intermediate 
nodes that could 
have been used 
to process 
packets, since 
the packets do 
not pass by them 
anyway 
2. Some nodes 
might have a 
wrong picture of  
the network 
topology 
1. This method 
saves the 
resources of other 
intermediate 
nodes that could 
have been used to 
process packets, 
since the packets 
do not pass by 
them anyway 
2. Some nodes 
might have a 
wrong picture of  
the network 
topology 
1. Victim nodes 
forward the 
requests of their 
neighbors to non 
neighbor nodes. 
This could delay or 
even stop the 
routing operation 
in case there are 
some nodes only 
surrounded by 
victim nodes 
There is a very high 
probability of 
collisions and 
packets loss 
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Counter-
measures 
Use of statistical 
methods to get the 
IDs of repeated 
nodes and use trace 
packets to get the 
proper network 
topology 
Also neighbor 
monitoring based 
solutions can help to 
make sure a RREQ 
is forwarded 
Time based 
solutions can 
help as a 
countermeasure 
to measure the 
difference of 
time 
Power 
measurement 
equipments could 
help. Also 
neighbor 
monitoring and 
time based 
solutions could 
help 
Distance  and time 
based solutions can 
help  
A priority scheme 
could be used to 
accept packets in the 
medium 
 
IV. WORMHOLE ATTACK SMULATIONS 
 In this section, we present simulation results obtained 
using the OPNET modeler. To illustrate the effect of the 
wormhole attack, we present three scenarios with different 
number of malicious nodes. The first is launched using only 
one node, the second used two malicious nodes and the third 
uses three malicious nodes. In the first two scenarios, the 
network consists of MANET nodes, and a heavy FTP server 
sending traffic to three nodes. The AODV routing protocol 
was configured on all nodes. Ad Hoc Network Parameters 
and Values for the first two scenarios with one and two 
malicious nodes  contains some of the values assigned to the 
ad hoc network parameters. 
 
TABLE II.  AD HOC NETWORK PARAMETERS AND VALUES FOR THE 
FIRST TWO SCENARIOS WITH ONE AND TWO MALICIOUS NODES  
Ad Hoc Network Parameters Values 
Route Request Retries 5 
Route Request Rate (pkts/sec) 10 
Active Route Time Out (Seconds) 15 s 
Hello Interval (Seconds) Uniform (5,6) 
Allowed Hello Loss 2 
Net Diameter 35 
Node Traversal Time (Seconds) 0.04 
Route Error Rate Limit (pkts/sec) 10 
Time Out Buffer 2 
TTL Threshold 7 
Addressing Mode IPV4 
 
In Normal Operation, the chosen best paths were found to 
be as shown in Figure 10. Under the wormhole attack of one 
malicious node, the path has changed as it is shown in 
Figure 11. We notice that all paths pass by malicious node 
36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Chosen paths for the different demands in normal network 
operation for the first scenario 
 
From the route report for IP traffic, the paths for each 
demand can be recorded as it is shown in Figure 11. These 
routes can be used in a program that calculates the number 
of routes traversing a specific node. If a node or a group of 
nodes were found to have more than a threshold number of 
routes passing by them, they become suspicious and further 
analysis could be done. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Chosen paths for different demands under the wormhole attack 
using one malicious node 
 
Other different scenarios were simulated for the out of band 
channel wormhole attack, using two malicious nodes. 
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Results have shown that, not only the traffic passes via the 
malicious nodes, but also intermediate nodes have been 
bypassed and hence the chosen path appears to have less 
number of hops.  
Figure 12 shows the ad hoc network routing under normal 
operation, and Figure 13 shows the wormhole attack with 
the two malicious nodes node 10 and node 15. From the 
path details screen shown in Figure 13, we notice that the 
routing does not pass by the node in between (node 28). To 
prove that the path chosen under wormhole attack should 
have normally passed through node 28, we have forced the 
routing to go through this path. As it is shown in Figure 14, 
node 28 is included in the path. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Chosen path for the configured demand in normal network 
operation for the second scenario 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Ad hoc network under the wormhole attack of two colluding 
nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 14  Regular forced same wormhole path without the wormhole 
attack for the second scenario 
 
Finally, we present another scenario for the wormhole attack 
in the presence of three malicious nodes in a network 
consisting of 35 nodes with the network parameters as in 
Table III.  
TABLE III.  AD HOC NETWORK PARAMETERS FOR THE THIRD SCENARIO  
Ad Hoc Network Parameters Values 
Route Request Retries 5 
Route Request Rate (pkts/sec) 10 
Active Route Time Out (Seconds) 3 s 
Hello Interval (Seconds) Uniform (1,1.1) 
Allowed Hello Loss 10 
Net Diameter 35 
Node Traversal Time (Seconds) 0.04 
Route Error Rate Limit (pkts/sec) 10 
Time Out Buffer 2 
TTL Threshold 10 
Addressing Mode  IPV4 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the normal network routing for a 
configured demand between the source and destination 
nodes. Figure 16 shows the routing under the wormhole 
attack in the presence of three malicious nodes: node 12, 
node 14, and node 31. Finally, Figure 17 shows the forced 
routing in the same wormhole path without the presence of 
malicious nodes to show the effect of the wormhole attack 
bypassing node 13 and node 15. 
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Figure 15.  Normal routing in the third scenario 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Selected path under the wormhole attack using three malicious 
nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Forced regular path in the absence of the wormhole attack 
V. COMPLEX WORMHOLE ATTACKS 
In section III, we analyzed each attack mode in details 
and pointed to its added benefits from an attacker’s point of 
view. In this section, we suggest the improvement of 
wormhole attacks, from an attacker’s perspective by 
introducing the concept of complex wormhole attacks. By 
complex wormhole attacks we mean the merging of two or 
more modes of wormhole attacks to benefit from their added 
advantages. 
The first complex attack uses encapsulation in 
combination with directed out of band channel. This can be 
done by encapsulating the RREQ packets, sending them to 
colluding node using a long-range directional wireless link or 
a direct wired link. The benefits of this complex attack are 
having a faster and more guaranteed arrival of RREQs. The 
challenge in this method is to find a colluding node close 
enough to destination, a good distribution and 
communication of colluding nodes is needed. To overcome 
this challenge, a list of neighbors could be exchanged 
between colluding nodes, or more practically we can just 
encapsulate the RREQ and send it to all colluding nodes. 
One could think that another complex attack might be 
launched using encapsulation in conjunction with high power 
transmission as in that case the encapsulated packet will 
arrive to ANY node which is more dangerous and 
meaningless from the attacker’s point of view! 
Encapsulation can also be used jointly with protocol 
deviations to send the packet faster however the 
encapsulation itself will take more time. The best scenario is 
to have a large number of malicious nodes that do not back 
off, now for this attack the challenge is to check for the 
minimum number of malicious nodes that would be effective 
in launching such an attack. Thus those two complex attacks 
have used encapsulation, and to compensate the added time 
of encapsulation, other attack modes were used in 
conjunction to speed up the attack and make it more 
efficient. To hide the malicious node identities during 
encapsulation, packet relay can be used. The most important 
is to have a predetermined clear route between colluding 
nodes. In that case packet relay mode has also benefited from 
sending regular packets and not RREQ packets within the 
network, which makes the hiding of packets much easier.  
If there is a suitable number of malicious nodes on the path 
between two nodes out of range that manage to send their 
control packets to convince them they are neighbors, using 
the packet relay mode of attacks, the use of protocol 
deviation will add a speed to the delivery of control packets, 
which makes the path more attractive from the points of 
view speed and number of hops as well.  
For the purpose of speeding up the packet delivery while 
hiding the malicious nodes identities, packet relay could be 
used with out of band channels, this will help to minimize 
the needed number of relay nodes to convince two extremely 
distant nodes that they are neighbors. This is also much safer 
for the attacker, while having more attractive speedy paths 
with minimum number of hops. However this channel, as we 
mentioned before, needs special arrangements. Packet relay 
could also be used with high power transmission this will 
add the two important features of both modes which are 
anonymity and speed. More complex attacks could be 
launched using three attack modes in conjunction. For 
instance, encapsulation with packet relay and protocol 
deviations. In that case encapsulation is used to transform 
control packets to regular packets, packet relaying is used to 
hide the identities of encapsulating nodes and making them 
invisible, and finally either protocol deviation could be used 
to speed up the packets routing.  Out of band channels could 
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also be used as the third stage, to make the attack speedier, 
however they suffer from the need of special arrangements. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTIRE WORK 
In this paper we introduced the wormhole attack, 
presented its different modes in details together with an 
attack graph that we constructed to illustrate the sequence of 
events in each mode. We also discussed the threats that this 
attack presents briefly, and overviewed the effort done in the 
literature to combat this attack. While wearing an attacker’s 
hat, we analyzed each mode and identified its advantages, 
disadvantages, challenges, possible solutions to these 
challenges, minimum number of nodes to launch each attack 
mode, suitable network topology, and countermeasures that 
could be used and have to be considered while launching 
each wormhole attack mode. To illustrate this attack’s effect 
we presented the simulation results of two modes of this 
attack. The analysis has helped us, while still wearing the 
attacker’s hat, to improve the wormhole attack by 
introducing the concept of complex wormhole attacks. In this 
type of attacks many modes have been suggested to be used 
in conjunction to benefit from the advantages of each to 
compensate for other modes disadvantages. Ethically, this 
type of wormhole analysis is important to account for 
possible new dangers and variations of this attack. 
Furthermore, it can help in putting some constraints on the 
network topology to design a robust network for such 
attacks, and in the design of new and more powerful attack 
countermeasures. In the future we plan to simulate complex 
attacks and compare their performance to select the optimum 
complex attack method from an attacker’s point of view. 
Once selected, it will be tested with some of the proposed 
countermeasures and will help in the development of new 
attack prevention and detection schemes. 
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